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At some point during pregnancy women
are typically encouraged to undergo a
screening test in order to estimate the
likelihood of fetal chromosomal aberra-
tions. While timelines vary, the major-
ity of pregnant women are screened
within their first trimester (De Graaf
et al., 2002). In the event of a positive
test result, an invasive diagnostic assess-
ment is usually recommended, namely
amniocentesis or chorionic villus sam-
pling (CVS). The combined test, widely
considered to be the most feasible and
effective screening procedure, involves an
integrated assessment of: maternal age,
fetal Nuchal Translucency (NT), maternal
serum pregnancy-associated plasma pro-
tein A (PAPP-A), and free β human chori-
onic gonadotropin (β-hCG). This assay
is most reliable when performed nearest
to the 11th week of gestation (Malone
et al., 2005), at which its detection rate
and false positive rate for trisomy 21, in
optimal conditions, are approximately 95
and 5%, respectively (Nicolaides, 2004).
A variety of competing screening tech-
niques are available in the first trimester,
and though we focus on the combined test
in our example below, the point raised in
this article applies to each of them.
A first-trimester screening assay car-
rying a relatively low false-positive rate
might seem a reasonable option for
women already considered to be at low
risk—the vast majority of the preg-
nant population. Following such prenatal
screening for trisomy 21, most women
who test positive for high risk proceed with
invasive diagnostic testing. This decision
to proceed with invasive testing is typically
based on the presence of any evidence of
increased risk brought to light by the pre-
cursory screening test (Nicolaides, 2004).
It is important to note, however, that the
proportion of those who advance to inva-
sive diagnostic testing is virtually identical
to the false-positive rate of initial screening
(Nicolaides, 2004).
Applying trisomy 21 as an example (see
Figure 1 for a graphical representation of
the numbers), the pregnant women who
receive a false positive score in their first-
trimester screening (∼5%) would subse-
quently undergo a supplementary invasive
diagnostic procedure, such as amniocen-
tesis or CVS. This implies that out of
every 100,000 pregnant women initially
screened, roughly 5100 test positive, out of
which ∼5000 cases are actually false pos-
itives. The follow-up diagnostic tests are
associated with serious procedure-related
health risks, including a ∼1% increased
chance of miscarriage (see Mujezinovic
and Alfirevic, 2007 for a systematic review;
also, a recent nation-wide 11-year longi-
tudinal study in Denmark established an
increased chance of miscarriage of 1.4%
and 1.9% linked to amniocentesis and CVS
respectively, with CVS growing in its pre-
dominance worldwide; Tabor et al., 2009).
Thus, at least 50 of the above ∼5000 false-
positive cases that involve normal fetuses
ultimately result in diagnostic procedure-
induced miscarriage. Of course with either
a higher false-positive rate or a lower dis-
ease prevalence, those numbers worsen.
Discerning the trustworthiness of a
given positive result in a screening test
warrants calculating (typically from the
information provided in the respective
consent form) the test’s positive predictive
value (PPV; in this case the proportion of
Down syndrome cases relative to the total
amount of positive results). This requires
knowledge of the base incidence rate of the
congenital defect of interest, and the sen-
sitivity and false-positive rate of the test.
Computation and proper interpretation
of this index, however, is often obscured
by the complexity of Bayesian reasoning
involved. This, among other factors, may
underlie the well-known inadequacy of
current procedures intended to achieve
informed consent (Green et al., 2004). For
30-year-old pregnant women, the preva-
lence of Down syndrome is roughly 1 out
of every 800 fetuses (Nicolaides, 2004; this
statistic varies with maternal age and time-
point during pregnancy). In a sample of
100,000 pregnant women of the general
population, therefore, around 125 of them
would be expected to carry a fetus with
the condition. Given the relatively high
sensitivity of the screening assay (95% in
optimal conditions), a majority of those
fetuses are eventually correctly diagnosed
with Down Syndrome (∼119 out of 125).
But when we merge this information with
the said ∼5000 false positives, we see that
119 positive results in the combined test
faithfully reveal trisomy 21, out of a total
5113 (119 + 4994) positive results. Hence,
the PPV of the combine test in a screen-
ing context nears 2% (119/5113). In other
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FIGURE 1 | Chart depicting the relationship between incidence of Down Syndrome (Trisomy 21), false positives in prenatal screening, and
miscarriages caused by the recommended follow-up diagnostic assessment (Amniocentesis/CVS) in a sample of 100,000 pregnant women.
words, there is a 2% chance of actually
carrying a fetus with trisomy 21 after test-
ing positive in a screening combined test.
This information—essential to an edu-
cated decision on the matter—is usually
overlooked by practitioners, and generally
absent from medical consent forms.
In recent decades, our ineptitude for
making sense of Bayesian information has
been the subject of extensive study (for a
review see Barbey and Sloman, 2007). It
is widely recognized that humans struggle
in dealing with Bayesian problems pre-
sented in terms of normalized probabilities
(i.e., relative probabilities or percentages)
or in cases of vague information struc-
ture (Barbey and Sloman, 2007). A sub-
stantial portion of the research on this
topic has been done within the scope
of medicine and epidemiology, wherein
Bayesian inference pervades disease detec-
tion and characterization. It is well known
that even medical practitioners struggle
to interpret such information (Gigerenzer
et al., 2007; but see Pighin et al., 2014
for a more optimistic outlook). The issue
saliently manifests in the prevailing appeal
of massive screening programs to the
general public, policy-makers, and physi-
cians alike. This appeal—mainly due to the
perceived advantages of early diagnosis—
fails to be balanced by sufficient considera-
tion of the high propensity for false alarms
and over-diagnosis. The theoretic difficul-
ties that most primary care physicians,
for instance, seem to encounter with this
type of information (e.g., cancer screening
statistics) disposes them to a dispropor-
tionate veneration for the potential bene-
fits of disease screening, as they drastically
underrate the seriousness of relevant risks.
Gigerenzer et al. have advised on the
pernicious use of massive screenings with
respect to prostate cancer, HIV infection,
etc. (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). False pos-
itives can be highly problematic in their
ensuing psychosocial turmoil, and with
respect to iatrogenic complications and
economic costs associated with unneces-
sary clinical intervention. Moreover the
problems, as we have seen above, don’t
stop at this. Medical knowledge ought to
be conveyed lucidly, in a manner that facil-
itates informed decision-making, specifi-
cally accounting for the common cognitive
challenges and inter-individual variation
observed in probability literacy (Johnson
and Tubau, 2013; Lesage et al., 2013; Låg
et al., 2014; Sirota et al., 2014a). With
respect to clinical screening data, sufficient
understanding of the numbers not only
entails being in a position to competently
evaluate pertinent risks; it further entails
being enabled to recognize the possibility
that even tests carrying low false-positive
rates may simply be inadequate for detect-
ing low-prevalence diseases, particularly in
massive-screening settings.
There is growing convergence in cog-
nitive psychology regarding the chief fac-
tors that mediate computation of Bayesian
reasoning problems. Furthermore some
practical improvements in the communi-
cation of statistical information have been
proposed (while focus on evolutionary
underpinnings of these issues appears to
have taken a back seat in the literature
(Barbey and Sloman, 2007; Navarrete and
Santamaría, 2011). With respect to under-
standing Bayesian problems, apart from
intrinsic differences across individuals, in
cognitive resources (Lesage et al., 2013; Låg
et al., 2014; Sirota et al., 2014a) or numer-
acy skill (Hill and Brase, 2012; Johnson
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and Tubau, 2013; Låg et al., 2014), several
other factors that pertain to informational
presentation per se have been deemed rel-
evant to reasoning performance. These
include (but are not limited to): prob-
lem structure (Barbey and Sloman, 2007;
Lesage et al., 2013; Sirota et al., 2014a), the
availability of a causal framework (Krynski
and Tenenbaum, 2007), representational
format (Hoffrage et al., 2002), and ref-
erence class (Fiedler et al., 2000; Lesage
et al., 2013). Over and above intellectual
aptitude, the verymanner in which a prob-
lem’s terms are conveyed to the subject
is arguably imperative to the normative
Bayesian response.
The above theoretical advancements
have translated into numerous helpful
strategies for representing and commu-
nicating Bayesian information. Regarding
medical risk problems, if a subject is
provided with the relevant information
comprising the standard menu (i.e., hit
rate, false positive rate and prevalence;
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), the most
effective way known to facilitate reasoning
is to ensure that the problem’s set structure
is entirely clarified to the subject (Barbey
and Sloman, 2007). Natural frequen-
cies (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), or
more generally, absolute reference classes
(Fiedler, 2000; Lesage et al., 2013) are
widely considered instrumental to this
end. Another important factor, admittedly
difficult to disentangle conceptually from
the previous one, is computational com-
plexity (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995;
Barbey and Sloman, 2007). Reducing a
subject’s need to carry out computations
(even those of simple arithmetic opera-
tions) can substantially enhance reasoning
performance. Moreover the use of iconic
and interactive representations has been
shown to improve performance accuracy
(Brase, 2009; Tsai et al., 2011; Micallef
et al., 2012; Sirota et al., 2014b). Finally,
an increasingly important area of research
in this regard pertains to the development
of training-programs designed to improve
patients’ and physicians’ comprehension
and computation of Bayesian problems
(Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001; Sirota
et al., 2014c).
There is a persistent need for advancing
research concerning efficacious commu-
nication of Bayesian information, such
that it can be comprehended by as many
individuals as possible—most urgently,
those who intervene in health care decision
making, such as clinicians and policy-
makers. Wide-scale disease screenings
hold both advantages and drawbacks
(Gigerenzer et al., 2007), and a clear
cognizance of their performance char-
acteristics and the numbers underlying
them is crucial to the state of pub-
lic health and safety. At the moment,
however, sufficient understanding of
them is strikingly scarce, and with each
passing year an unacceptable number
of prospective parents are pressed to
carry out a critical decision of poten-
tially daunting consequences, without
adequate knowledge of the important
risks. And, of course, the quintessential
challenges inherent to Bayesian rea-
soning are appreciable well beyond the
domain of prenatal screening, posing
egregious threats to the security and
well-being of both the individual and the
public.
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